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I. Introduction 
 
As Ortega wrote, only the scientist specializes, but science itself does not.
1
 Inter- and 
multidisciplinary approach have got foreground recognizing this circumstance. And I 
distinguish interdisciplinarity from multidisciplinarity at this point. Namely in my 
interpretation the phenomena are interdisciplinary, and the cognition of them is 
multidisciplinary from different aspects. The things as momenta of reality are accessible from 
a lot of possible different aspects. It is true even if we do not take this circumstance into 
account in every case. Thus, although we tend to accept the legal institutions as being 
separated from other phenomena and other no-legal approaches according to our positivistic 
tradition, law and legal phenomena are interdisciplinary. 
The conceptual analysis of law provides a lot of chances to discover the internal logic of a 
certain law. However, as we know, the life of the law has not been logic, it has been 
experience.
2
 It is also clear, that the essence of law is in its function and this function can be 
realized just by the operation of law. The conceptual approaches are not able to catch this 
operation by analysis of the concepts. However the functional approaches of law can take us 
along to a concept of law theoretically. Of course, the analytical-conceptual way can be 
highly helpful in cognition, but it is true first of all at such developed legal systems, which 
build themselves by concepts. We should not forget, that our modern legal systems have not 
been built by only concepts and theoretical categories. Namely these systems are continuation 
of a special ideological structure, which consisted of Christian morality, an irrational (but 
often expedient and efficient) system of the feudal domination and the Roman law. These are 
the deeper bases of our legal systems. Consequently we cannot renounce the analysis and 
inquiry of the past phenomena during cognition of the nature of our law. The historical aspect 
has a special importance from this point of view. 
That is also clear, that legal philosophy is an interdisciplinary area, because this domain is 
situated between territory of the law and field of the philosophy. In spite of this fact, the 
acceptance of inter- and multidisciplinarity proved to be significantly harder in jurisprudence 
(as in humanities in general) than in natural sciences. Although this phenomenon can have 
various causes, however I tend to think that the most probable reason for this is in nature of 
humanities. Namely natural science is organized on the basis of expediency, whereas 
ideological momenta have a bigger role in the human disciplines and cultural evolution.
3
 
These contain such belief-like elements (imagination and ideas) which resist more strongly 
new thoughts and approaches than pragmatic-rational reflections.  
From these aspects the traditional, analytical-conceptual attempts are especially interesting in 
approaches to the phenomena of normativity and validity. Also that is thought-provoking, 
how the categories of phenomenon and the concepts can get confused in this inquiry in certain 
measure. Moreover, certain paradox gets into these researches. We can expound only such 
elements from a concept, which have been taken into that previously. Namely, a concept can 
not exist without its creator, although the phenomenon, which is covered by philosopher, can.  
We instinctively interrogate the modern concepts of normativity and validity on the basis of 
our democratic and rational ideology, however simultaneously we tend to smuggle certain 
contents into the examined concept. Contents, which are not in the concept necessarily. Thus, 
we should distinguish phenomena of normativity and validity from concepts of normativity 
and validity. I suppose, that the phenomenon of normativity (or validity) is rooted deeply in 
the complex of the human behavior (this is a special conglomerate of characteristics of human 
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behavior),
4
 especially in obedience.
5
 Fundamentally irrational momenta get importance in this 
phenomenon, but rational considerations significantly do not. Numerous efforts try to explain 
normativity in the context of conscious decisions, and these explanations do not take into 
account the irrational nature of real social processes.
6
 Thus, the concept of the normativity (or 
validity) is not discoverable by only a conceptual analysis, but its approach is possible by 
observation and in a descriptive way. Perhaps the duality of phenomenon and concept is the 
biggest trap for the legal philosophers. Western thinking makes us believe, the conceptual 
way provides the best solution for cognition.  
However carefully contemplating over these things, we have to accept the circumstance, that 
we should not use previous ideological suppositions (for example natural legal thoughts about 
will of majority or legal positivistic ideas about faultless creation of the norms and validity), if 
we wish to discover normativity (or validity) as a value-neutral ontological category. We 
should previously observe the operation of such things, about which we create concept 
subsequently. Frankly speaking, if we examine the men-created law and its validity and 
normativity, it is expedient to know the real nature of humankind, and not only which we 
wish to see about mankind and its law. However in this case we open wide the door of the 
legal philosophy and we have to look into the disciplines of the human nature. And we cannot 
be sure, that we see, it will be identical our previous ideological expectations about humanity.  
 
II. From natural law to nature of law 
 
Although Grotius and Pufendorf reminded us of the culturally determined character of law, 
the plurality of legal forms and spirits of the legal systems became more and more clear by the 
opening of the historical (and of course geographical) perspective. The historical view and the 
interpretation of social processes on the basis of their reasons and causes brought a 
sociological view to the foreground, while sociology also shaped an independent discipline. 
Legal sociology developed a separated direction of the research on the trails of works of 
Ludwig Gumplowicz
7
 and Max Weber
8
, further enlarging the perspective of legal philosophy. 
Also the revolution of the psychology, researches of Pierre Janet, Sigmund Freud, Alfred 
Adler and Carl Gustav Jung did not leave legal philosophy intact and untouched. The 
existence of the law appears as a special interference of conscious and unconscious, 
instinctive mechanisms in the works of Scandinavian and American legal realism. Theories 
relating to culture and anthropology have helped comparative legal research, and legal 
anthropology come into existence too, while the scientific analysis of the literature formed the 
stream of „law and literature”, and economy laid the foundation of the economical analysis of 
law. However the traditional questions and problems of the legal philosophy revolved around 
legal positivism and natural law in spite of gradual multidisciplinary transformation of 
philosophy of law.  
Austin, Somló, Kelsen and Merkl and of course Langdell could summarize the problems of 
the law (as an autonomous phenomenon) in a so attractive way, and Stammler, Radbruch, 
Verdross, Rawls, Messner argued for the theory of the natural law so originally, that the 
tension of this two characteristic standpoints influenced with a special force the discussion of 
the legal philosophy. Some decades later in the Critical Legal Studies (a highly exciting 
continuation of the American Legal Realism) the psychological stream became stronger 
again, but its (CLS) ideological disposition and its activist character has limited to the chances 
of this tendency in paradigmatic renascence and regeneration of legal philosophy. 
In the middle of the 20
th
 century a new discipline came into being again, namely ethology. On 
the basis of researches of Konrad Lorenz and other scientists not only animal’s behavior has 
been examined, but the scientific interest has been spreading on areas of human nature and 
behavior of mankind, and on the cognition and evolutionary description of humankind as a 
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race. In this process among others Eibl-Eibesfeldt and such social-psychologists created 
lasting works, who especially lively exposed human behavior, which is in the most cases 
independent of the cultural circumstances. 
The ideological, quite idealistic and fundamentally speculative natural law got a chance to 
renewal from the biological, evolutionary view-point. Margaret Gruter, attempted to approach 
the phenomena of law
9
 on the basis of biological determination of the human behavior, and 
such excellent legal scholars joined her efforts as Wolfgang Fikentscher.
10
 Thus, a new 
inspiration of legal thought arose again in the German cultural area after Pufendorf, Kant, 
Hegel etc., but this tendency could reach break-through only in America. Gruter completed a 
pioneering work by her fundamental books, foundation of Gruter Institute, and by initiating 
international conferences. Owen D. Jones continues Gruter’s way not only by excellent 
writings,
11
 but he managed to systematize evolutionary jurisprudential efforts by the 
organization of the Society Evolutionary Analysis in Law.  
However, all these ambitions and exertions exist just as alternatives of the mainstream of legal 
philosophy. It is also clear that the biological interpretation of law
12
  is spreading in the same 
way, as the research of law as an interdisciplinary phenomenon. The establishment of the 
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal was a quite early moment of the latter 
process in 1978. Nowadays inter- and multidisciplinary research and interpretation come to 
the foreground more and more at universities and institutions.  
The common aspects of the law and the environment are accentuated at the Vanderbilt 
University Law School over and above evolution related researches of Jones. The Centre for 
Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies at the Ohio State University Moritz College wishes 
to illuminate the connections of law, nature, society and the culture. In 1990s reorganized 
Interdisciplinary Academic Programs of the University of Chicago Law School properly 
shows the essence of multidisciplinary legal efforts, namely „the law does not exist in a 
vacuum”. However the Planning an Interdisciplinary Curriculum of the Vermont Law School 
aims a many-sided approach of the law in the same way. The Yale Law School Forum on 
Multidisciplinary Legal Research has facilitated intellectual exchange among graduate 
students with research in legal or legal-related issues by more meetings. Especially 
remarkable are researches of David Garland at the New York University School of Law, 
which map the connections between punishment and culture.
13
  However in Europe also there 
are some ambitions to break out from our traditional concepts and theories, eliminating 
boundaries between legal and non-legal phenomena. John Bell properly has warned „The 
study of all legal subjects need to be informed by theory and perspectives non-legal 
disciplines.”14 Related to the change of thinking Maurio Zamboni’s article is very 
considerable, which marks acclimatization of evolutionary theory in the domain of legal 
theory.
15
    
With some superficiality we can establish that in the theoretical researches of law the cultural 
approach, biological-evolutionary interpretations,
16
 and in general multidisciplinary 
tendencies gain more and more ground.
17
 The biological tendency is fundamentally related to 
that fact, that in the past half century such an amount of scientific knowledge concerning 
mankind has been accumulated, that cannot be neglected by legal philosophy. The change of 
our image about human nature allows us less and less to base the examination of the law on 
old and ideological thought. 
As an explanation for the multidisciplinary approach of law it appears in the most cases, that 
lawyers have to prepare themselves for certain special knowledge relating to that profession, 
rules of which will be used by them. Although it is true, there are two more cardinal reason 
for changing view. Firstly, a general inter- and multidisciplinary tendency of the science, 
secondly the legal positivistic idea about the autonomy of law, as among others theory of 
Langdell drafted, is less and less tenable. These circumstances touch first of all practice, 
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legislation and application of the law. However we should know, the multidisciplinary legal 
research, and multidisciplinary analysis of law are important in the legal philosophy too. 
Moreover, legal philosophy has to clarify the structural inter-relations among the approaches 
of different scientific disciplines. In an optimal case various approaches to law do not coexist 
just incidentally, haphazardly, offering only alternative aspects. Thus, in my interpretation the 
multidisciplinary legal research in the long run is not only a conglomerate of the coequal 
viewpoints, but it is a special system from generality to peculiarity, wherein the examination 
is fundamentally adapted to the respective ontological, law-determining levels. Namely really 
existing (thus not hypothetical and imaginary) legal systems have been built on certain 
biological determinants, onto the basis of the complex of human behavior. Of course, this 
basis permits several, often conflicting, solutions, but from these cultural characteristics and 
traditions select and shape the actual institutions.  
   Within the culturally determined system of course there is room for conceptual approaches 
and analyses of the law, but first of all only where the legal system exhibits a definite 
conceptual construct. Thus I presume that three fundamental levels of the approaches to law 
can be distinguished (biological, cultural and conceptual), which also could be complemented 
by horizontal viewpoints. We will return to these later. 
 
III.Multidisciplinary cogitations 
 
Some years ago I attempted to outline the spiritual origin of the Roman law, which 
undoubtedly constitutes the basis of Western law, especially of the continental legal 
systems.
18
At the beginning it was clear for me that in the Roman law the strictly controlled 
forms not only restrict prevalences of equity and justice, but those result in the autonomy of 
law, result in law, as a separate phenomenon. The anxious-ritualistic attitude of the ancient 
Roman law was conspicuous as opposed to the collective ideas about the „Proper” of Indo-
European tribes. 
In Greece and in Rome in the public meetings not a formal concept of justice and law 
dominated. Where did the rituality and a strict and anxious form-centered thinking derive 
from, as they are visible at „mantipatio”, at „stipulatio” and at „in iure cessio”? Where did the 
fatalistic morale appear from, which attaches serious consequences to defective contractual 
words and expressions? On the basis of Kirkegaard’s thoughts19 and theories of modern 
psychology (namely on the basis of obsessive-compulsive disorder)
20
 I presumed connection 
between the anxiety and adherence to formality and rituality.  
Simultaneously I took Jung’s warning into account, that autonomous complexes exist as 
fundamental structures of the unconscious Psyche.
21
 That this is true, is shown excellently by 
superstitious practices of numerous people, especially by the superstitions of actors. When 
they are before difficult tasks, they often cling stubbornly to certain objects or activities for 
success. They are in general not neurotic people, at least not more so than others. On the other 
hand we should not forget that cultural systems and processes can select and strengthen 
certain phenomena of human behavior. Thus, some elements of manner of the elite group, 
which elements exist in this group habitually and instinctively, can spread wholly in cultural 
or social way by conscious or unconscious imitation, sometimes giving special senses to these 
elements. A peculiar characteristic, which derives from psychical function, can influence 
other people by social and cultural mechanisms. Peoples, who are fundamentally not 
determined by these phenomena. Thus, it seems, there is no characteristic demarcation line 
between so-called normality and psychotic conditions.  
The Roman formalistic and fatalistic view could not originate from such Indo-European 
religion, about which Coulanges wrote,
22
 because Diaus-Pitar (Zeus-Iuppiter) represented an 
active force. However we know, Etruscans respected highly the power of the Fate, and their 
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oracles prophesied among others the decline of Etruscans themselves by strictly determined 
processes.
23
 We have numerous reasons to suppose that the formality of the Roman law 
originated from the Etruscan culture, which had a special fatalistic and very formalistic 
religion with a lot of misgivings and anxiety. For understanding of this important connection 
between the Etruscan religion and Roman law, which determines our modern law, we should 
consider such elements of Roman cultural area, which can enlighten that Etruscan culture 
formed the deepest layer of Roman civilization.  
 As it is also well known, Etruria was a sacred alliance of twelve cities, and it significantly 
influenced Roma from the earliest beginning.
24
 It is considerable too, „Roma” (or Ruma) is a 
name of an Etruscan tribe, and the names of Roman tribes (Ramnes, Tities, Luceres) 
originated from Etruscans too.
25
 Romulus and Remus decided the right to establish the Urbs 
by Etruscan augurium. The winner, Romulus spotted twelve eagles according to Etruscan 
sacred number, as opposed to the decimal system of so-called Italics (for example Latins, 
Sabins), but Remus only half of them, six.
26
 The historical authenticity of this story is 
indifferent, but it is very important and significant that legend preserved the story of 
establishment of the Urbs so and by such symbols. 
That is also significant circumstance, the wolf, which looked after the twin babies, was 
especially respected by the Turkish nations in Central-Asia, but was not too much liked by 
Indo-Europeans.
27
 Also that is not quite recognized moment, that Vergil made the Romans’ 
forefather originate from Asia in the Aeneis. As it is supposed, this continent likely was the 
home of Etruscans before their arrival to Italy.   
Etruscans susceptibility to symbols is also reflected by another moment of legend. Namely 
Remus had to die, because he for fun flipped symbolical wall of the town,
28
 which was just a 
furrow drawn by plough in Etruscan way.
29
 This event, without revenge, must have been an 
unfavorable omen relating to defense of Urbs.  
The sacred number of Etruscans,
30
 which expressed the totality (see twelve agreeing gods, 
twelve seven-years-lasting periods of human life) got also outstanding significance in Rome: 
the first Roman coin consisted of twelve uncia, the law of XII Tables, which was enforced by 
the (fundamentally Latin and Sabin) plebs, and which was carved on ten tables in the first 
version. Etruscan influence on Rome is well known from the lictors over the toga to the 
architecture. However different characters of Etruscan and Italic legal ideas is excellently 
illuminated by the story of Horatians and Curiatians, wherein patrician duumvirs (encultured  
fundamentally in the Etruscan way) decided formally, but public meeting, which consisted of 
mainly Italics, made its decision fairly and with equity. 
It is also characteristic of this dynamic cultural relation that Roman law began getting equity, 
when (Latin and Sabin) plebeian and Greek ideas gradually penetrated it. Typically this is the 
period of emancipation of plebs, when sacerdotal offices, which were at this time 
jurisdictional charges (College of Pontiffs, praetors), opened for plebeians. This circumstance 
and in general the prosperity of the plebs had consequences in the foreign policy of Rome. 
Namely the fatalistic, defensive attitude gradually was replaced by the more offensive attitude 
of religion of Italic Quirinus, and in the 3rd century Rome began the conquests. 
Roman law has left its formalistic religious background, but it preserved its relatively formal 
separation, and its formality became a secular-rational structure. It is a very important 
moment that this law could be separated because of the Roman moral duality. The patrician 
law involved and preserved a fatalistic-formalistic morale, but the ideas about justice 
remained in non-formal condition in the plebeian cultural area. The „immoral, but legal” 
positivistic conception and principle take its origin from here. Namely our law, especially 
continental law, is founded on a system (Roman law), which wears marks of a fatalistic and 
formalistic religious morale. On the other hand our morality is impregnated by Indo-
European, Turkish and Christian active, non-fatalistic spirit. Without consideration of this 
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circumstance we can hardly get a clear view relating to such duality of legal positivism versus 
natural law, which is not known so sharply in other legal cultures. 
Moreover, previous researches ignored connection between the Etruscan religion and the 
Roman law despite religious determination of Roman law had been well known from 
Demelius
31
 to Max Weber,
32
 Wolff
33
 and McCormack.
34
 On the other hand, that has been 
clear for a long time, that Etruscan religion had exerted influence on Roman religion. In order 
to see the chain of „Etruscan religion – Roman religion – Roman law” and to compare 
structural similarities of Roman law and Etruscan religion, we should surpass the exclusively 
legal aspects and we should examine the question in historical, psychological and religious 
contexts.  
Thus, we have to use a multidisciplinary approach, which does not take notice the limitations 
of previous considerations, but that always focuses on the emerging particular problems. 
During this process the topical question determines, selects and chooses the viewpoint of a 
certain discipline. That question, which is connected with the concrete discipline best. 
Consequently, multidisciplinary legal research, at least for me, is not only a theoretically 
acceptable possibility, but it is a practically tested and imperative method. 
  
IV.On system of multidisciplinary legal thinking 
 
In the Western culture a quite holy and idealistic view existed, because of a long domination 
of the Christian morality. This notion was followed and pushed to the background by a 
secular-rational vision about the human. Reformation, and its rational attitude played and 
eminent role in this process. The irrational aspects as a consequence of the result of modern 
psychology came to the front in 19
th
 century. Then a highly sophisticated human-view 
appeared by the emergence of ethology and human ethology. Humankind is characterized in 
this scientific interpretation simultaneously among others by belief-like ideas (common 
beliefs),
35
 inclination to constructions, altruism, indoctrinablity and tendency to imitation.
36
 
Human ethology explains human character by evolutionary factors and processes, 
emphasizing characteristic elements can gain varying importance in various cultures. The 
environment and the above mentioned inclination to imitation and indoctrinablity can get a 
huge significance in shaping of concrete cultural forms.
37
 General human characteristics, as 
sociability, sensitiveness to mutuality, obedience, so called rule-following behavior and 
distinction between own group and alien group are present in all human societies. 
Consequently, during the examination of social rules and law we should set out from such 
scientific vision about people, which describes and defines mankind as a race. This means 
omission of ideological views and departure from fundamentally emotionally determined 
approaches and concepts, and this means necessarily the consideration of human ethological 
model and facts, especially the so-called complex of human behavior. Thus, there is a 
fundamental biological, human ethological and evolutionary psychological level of the 
examination of law, which discovers for us, what the human nature is in general. This human 
quality can create various institutions and processes, however in the reality we always meet 
quite definite and concrete forms of phenomena. Namely every single culture shapes its 
solutions according to its own spirit and postulates whether in religion, in science and art, or 
relating to different social control.
38
 So, in my interpretation, the second level of examination 
of law must be the cultural level, wherein cultural anthropological, legal sociological 
viewpoints can come to the front, and aspects of philosophy of religion and history of 
religion, or philosophy of history could get in focus. We should take into account this natural 
level in order to avoid numerous intellectual and ideological traps. For example the slavery is 
not accepted by natural law, however Aristotle thought this institution coming from nature. 
Moreover, opposite to our modern human opinions, slavery has been and is present 
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everywhere, but sometimes this phenomenon is marginal, illegal and it is named 
euphemistically. However, it emerges so stubbornly, that it cannot be opposite to nature. 
Consequently, we should examine very carefully the occurrence of slavery, and we should 
take very seriously this phenomenon in order to know, eliminate and remove that. As I 
suppose, this phenomenon is connected to the distinction between own group and alien group, 
because slavery can exist relatively lastingly in intercultural or intersexual relations. (See 
source of slavery from captivity; black slavery; in Rome selling of debtors as slaves „trans 
Tiberim”, so to an other group; or in general sexual slavery as usual from foreign counties.)39 
However within groups sociability, empathy and altruism are more significant. Thus, we 
should know humans openly and without illusions to develop humane societies and legal 
systems. 
On the verge of this two levels of inquiry there are psychological approaches simultaneously 
explaining the culturally and biologically coded phenomena. In my opinion for example the 
“father-complex” theory of Jerome Frank40 as a paraphrase or variation of ideas of Feud, the 
feminist legal theory (at Critical Legal Studies),
41
 and of course some of my ideas too, on the 
basis of Jung, mean among others such psychological analysis of the law. From this aspect 
numerous statements of Scandinavian Legal Realism are highly relevant. This psychological-
legal researches discover phenomena, which have got significant just in certain cultures, 
although which take their origins from nature.  
I regard the conceptual analysis of law as a third level of examination. This approach could 
have excellent importance in legal cultures, wherein the concepts and categories have more 
special significance, than in „average legal culture”. Thus, we have to use secular-rational 
concepts consistently, because Western law gradually became secularized and it detached 
itself from its religious roots and possibility of religious-moral interpretation. The reception of 
Roman law played a major role in conceptual effort. It seems, the analytical-conceptual 
ambitions got decisive necessarily in the Western legal philosophy. 
As I have mentioned, three levels (biological, cultural, conceptual) of legal examination 
model the levels of reality from generality to peculiarity. This is the so-called vertical system 
of cognition. Biological, evolutionary phenomena characterize all humankind, culturally 
coded phenomena are valid within a certain culture or cultural region. However concepts 
could have different meanings according to the domain of use of those concepts. Thus, the 
various scientific approaches are not accidental and only alternative, but they are 
complementary shaping a special system, and they impregnate spheres of each-other.     
However certain approaches are not situated on the basis of axis of the generality and the 
peculiarity, but they are arranged on the basis of domain of special interests. So moral-
philosophical, theological, nature legal, historical, literary (and other) approaches to law could 
comprehend more levels of generality and peculiarity. I regard these as a horizontal system of 
the legal examination.  
 
Rezümé 
 
A cikk bemutatja a jog fogalmi elemzésének korlátait, és a jog funkcionális és 
multidiszciplináris megközelítésében rejlő lehetőségeket. Vázolja a jogfilozófia történetének 
néhány állomását, és hangsúlyozza a jogfilozófia multidiszciplináris tendenciáinak terjedését. 
Megvilágítja a különböző tudományos megközelítések néhány összefüggését a római jog 
vallásos gyökereire vonatkozó egy konkrét kutatás alapján. Végül vázolja a 
multidiszciplináris jogi kutatások vertikális és horizontális struktúráit, amelyek az ontológiai 
szinteken és a speciális kutatási érdeklődéseken alapulnak. 
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